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I. Introduction
It is an honor to be invited to give the Inaugural Mayekawa Lecture, and it is a special
pleasure to return to Tokyo and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to do so. I would like to
begin the lecture by taking note of Governor Mayekawa’s comprehensive approach to
economic research and public policy problems during the 1970s and 1980s. Then, using
a similar approach, I will consider some of the difﬁculties that researchers and policy
makers face today.
II. A Comprehensive Approach to Research and Policy
The best way for me to describe the inﬂuential approach to research and policy that I
have found to be characteristic of Governor Mayekawa’s contributions is through sev-
eral examples or stories about his work at the BOJ and afterward. I start with monetary
policy in the 1970s.
A. Lessons Learned about Monetary Policy in Practice
Haruo Mayekawa served as Deputy Governor of the BOJ from 1974 to 1979 and as
Governor from 1979 to 1984. The late 1970s and early 1980s were, of course, very
challenging times for economic policymakers throughout the world. In many countries,
the Great Inﬂation was still raging and the Great Moderation was at best a glitter of
hope in the minds, or the computers, of monetary scholars.
But important lessons for the future were being learned by observing the excellent
performance by the BOJ and Governor Mayekawa during this period. By credibly com-
mitting to a non-inﬂationary monetary policy from the mid-1970s on—quickly learn-
ing from the experience of the ﬁrst oil shock of the early 1970s—the BOJ was able to
weather the oil shock of the late 1970s and keep it from passing through to the overall
inﬂation rate, unlike in the United States and most European economies.
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the ﬁrst one I attended (see Taylor [1988]). Several years later, in the 1991 Economic
Report of the President, the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, of which I was a
member at the time, used the success of Japan in contrast with the United States during
this period to show how credibly sticking to a low-inﬂation policy would mitigate the
impact of the oil shock following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, much more effectively
than an accommodative policy would. The comparison was made with the help of two
ﬁgures,whichIreproducehere(Figure1).Themaindifferencebetweentheupperchart,
which shows the United States, and the lower chart, which shows Japan, is that during
the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s (1977/Q1 to 1980/Q1) there was little or
no increase in inﬂation in Japan, whereas there was a large increase in inﬂation in the
United States. The lesson learned was very clear, and by the late 1990s it was being
applied elsewhere, including in the United States.
B. Research and the Creation of the Institute of Monetary
and Economic Studies
We also have to thank Governor Mayekawa for his support of research and the Institute
for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES), which was created more than a quarter-
century ago in 1982 at his suggestion. It is worth recalling his words at the inauguration
of theinstitute,for Ibelievetheprinciplesheestablishedfor abasicresearchdepartment
at a central bank have inﬂuenced researchers and visitors to the Institute ever since:
“Basic researches can be compared to the roots of a tree. They may not enjoy a high
proﬁle but are very important. A clear theoretical understanding of the ﬁnancial and
economic mechanism is the fundamental basis for understanding the essential forces
behind each phenomenon. This will help us recognize what type of side-effects myopic
policy actions may entail in the long run” (Okina [1998]).
Again the lesson is clear: Good policy requires good theoretical research. I know
that I have beneﬁted from the institute, as a Visiting Scholar in the spring and summer
of 1987 when Yoshio Suzuki was director, and at many of the international conferences
since then. So have many other monetary economists.
C. The Mayekawa Commission
Governor Mayekawa also had an important inﬂuence beyond monetary policy and cen-
tral banking. In 1986, at a time when protectionist pressures were building abroad,
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone established an Advisory Group on Economic Struc-
tural Adjustment for International Harmony. Its main charge was to recommend ways
to reduce the Japanese current account surplus, which was a source of the tension. He
chose Mayekawa, who by then had retired as Governor of the BOJ, as the chairman of
the advisory group, and from that time forward the group was called the “Mayekawa
Commission” and the initial report and its follow-up were called the “Mayekawa
Report.”
While the Mayekawa Report was aimed at reducing the current account surplus,
it recommended sensible market oriented economic policies rather than new restric-
tions. It emphasized “Freedom in principle, restrictions only as exceptions.” It sug-
gested that imports to Japan could be increased through deregulation of the retail and
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Figure 1 Inﬂation
Note: The impact on inﬂation of the oil shock of the late 1970s and early 1980s in Japan
(lower chart) was much lower than in the United States (upper chart).
Source: The two charts originally appeared in the 1991 Economic Report of the
President.
39other sectors. It was internationalist rather than isolationist or protectionist, stating as a
central purpose to “orient the [Japanese] economy toward international harmony.”
Several years after the Mayekawa report was released, the United States joined with
Japan in looking for ways to help implement the recommendations. And in order to re-
duce protectionist sentiments in the United States, a series of talks, called the structural
impediments initiative talks, was established jointly by Japan and the United States
government. Based on the economic idea that the current account deﬁcit is due to a gap
between investment and saving, the initiative stressed increasing saving in the United
States as well as investment in Japan. Both Japan and the United States would thereby
try to contribute to the effort. As a member of the U.S. side in these talks, I can say that
the Mayekawa Report was consulted and referenced often. Like the Mayekawa Report,
the suggested policies were ones that made economic sense whether or not the current
account was a problem. In my view, the report and such structurally oriented initiatives
did help to reduce protectionist pressures.
D. Recommending a Way Back to Growth in the World Economy
For my fourth example of Governor Mayekawa’s inﬂuence, I want to refer to a re-
markable speech he gave 25 years ago in 1983, the year of the First International
Conference at the BOJ where Milton Friedman (1983) and James Tobin (1983) both
gave keynote speeches. Governor Mayekawa’s speech was published along with the
speeches by Friedman and Tobin in the ﬁrst issue of the journal of IMES, Monetary
and Economic Studies.
The speech was given at a watershed time for much of the global economy. Indeed,
the kinds of policy ideas in his speech are, in my view, the reason it was a watershed.
We know now that 1983 (it is hard to pinpoint it exactly, maybe it was 1982 or 1984)
was the beginning of what monetary scholars call the Great Moderation or the Long
Boom. For at least a decade and a half before the Great Moderation started, the world
economy was beset with difﬁculties: high and variable inﬂation, frequent recessions,
ﬁnancial instability, high and rising energy prices. These were the problems Mayekawa
addressed in his speech. He recognized the inter-relationship between these problems
and boldly took them all on at the same time. The title of the speech, “The Way Back
to the Growth of the World Economy,” conveyed his diagnosis: economic policy had
gotten off track in the 1960s in many countries; this had led to deteriorating economic
performance; the Great Inﬂation years were the result. In essence, his recommendation
was to get back on track, by going back to basics (Mayekawa [1983]).
Mayekawa began his speech by emphasizing the importance of understanding the
causes of the economic difﬁculties before recommending policies to solve them—the
same theme he stressed in his inaugural address to the IMES, which I referred to ear-
lier. “Whether or not we can succeed in overcoming difﬁculties largely depends on our
capacity to properly assess fundamental causes for the emergence of the difﬁculties and
on our resolve to pursue appropriate policy options to eliminate them” he said. He em-
phasized that we had to take an international approach: “In working out the strategy to
overcome the present economic difﬁculties...[there]isthepressingneedforindividual
countries to design their policies in an international perspective...Nocountry...should
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and can maintain policies beneﬁting only its own people at the sacriﬁce of people in
other countries in this interdependent world.”
One of his main speciﬁc recommendations was to focus monetary policy on achiev-
ing price stability: “It is my considered opinion that the best way to master the present
difﬁculties is for all countries around the world to take a global viewpoint, aiming
at the objective of sustained non-inﬂationary growth.” Regarding exchange rates, he
thought that achieving price stability would help reduce commodity price volatility
and exchange rate volatility, but that from time to time exchange rates would drift
away from purchasing power parity and that intervention might then be appropriate.
He deemphasized countercyclical monetary policy and discretionary ﬁscal policy, say-
ing, “The present difﬁcult situation in the world economy cannot be overcome with
the expansionary demand management policy.” Regarding ﬁscal policy speciﬁcally,
he argued, “There is now little room for the use of ﬁscal policy to support demand.”
And “The reduction of the size of the public sector and of budget deﬁcits constitutes
one of the most pressing tasks in many developed and developing countries.” On the
microeconomic side, he emphasized deregulation and market ﬂexibility, saying that we
need to “promote smooth adjustment on the basis of the market mechanism” especially
to deal with rising energy costs. He argued for free international trade.
III. Today’s Economic Difﬁculties and the Need for a
Comprehensive Approach
The world economy is again faced with numerous economic difﬁculties. While as re-
searchers we frequently approach these problems separately, I believe they are closely
related and policymakers must recognize this interaction as they create, negotiate, and
implement solutions. The problems are also inherently global, cutting across sovereign
boundaries. For all these reasons, I believe that a bold broad “Mayekawan approach” is
needed today.
Although one must be careful when making generalizations, recognizing important
differences among countries, there is no doubt about the following:
￿ Global inﬂation is high and rising.
￿ Financial instability and risks are elevated.
￿ Energy, food, and many other commodity prices are at record highs in real terms.
￿ Current account imbalances remain high even though they are off their highs.
￿ Exchange rates policies are globally inconsistent, which, along with high energy
prices, has led to accumulations of ﬁnancial wealth by sovereign governments.
￿ Protectionist and isolationist sentiments are on the rise.
To be sure, there is a very important difference between the economic situation
today and that of the late 1970s/early 1980s. From the vantage point of 2008, we can
look back and see remarkably strong global growth and stability for at least a decade
in most parts of the world and for even longer in the United States and most devel-
oped economies. In contrast, from the vantage point of the early 1980s, economic per-
formance had been dismal for over a decade and a half with high inﬂation and fre-
quent deep recessions. Today’s economic problems—at leastthe manifestations of them
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mean they will be any easier to analyze and solve. Moreover, only one of the six I
mention here—inﬂation—is currently less severe than in the 1970s.
Let me now discuss several of these problems, illustrating some of the important
connections with the others.
A. Global Inﬂation
There is mounting evidence that inﬂation is acceleratingin many countries. According a
recent compilation by analysts at JPMorgan Chase (Global Data Watch, May 23, 2008),
the consumer price index (CPI) in emerging market countries averaged nearly 8 percent
over the 12 months ending this April, and has risen by 3 percentage points in the past
year. In developed countries, inﬂation averaged 4 percent over the same time period.
This implies a global average of about 6 percent. As the ﬁrst deputy managing director
of the International Monetary Fund, John Lipsky, recently warned: “To put the issue
starkly, inﬂation risks have reemerged as a global challenge following a long absence”
(Lipsky [2008]).
What is the cause of this reemergence? Since inﬂation is ultimately a monetary
phenomenon, the place to look for an answer is monetary policy. A key principle of
good monetary policy is that interest rates should increase by more than the increase in
inﬂation, after appropriate smoothing out of clearly temporary price changes. This will
keep inﬂation close to target by letting the real interest rate rise when inﬂation rises and
letting the real interest rate fall when inﬂation falls. See Woodford (2001).
However, during the past year, as global inﬂation has risen, global short-term in-
terest rate targets set by central banks have not increased on average by as much as in-
ﬂation; indeed the global average of these interest rate targets has actually fallen since
last summer. Again using the compilations of JPMorgan Chase, the GDP-weighted av-
erage central bank interest rate fell by 1 percentage point during the past year. Much
of this decline is due to the United States, where the federal funds rate has declined
by 3.25 percentage points. Excluding the cuts in the federal funds rate, the global av-
erage was effectively unchanged (declining by 3 basis points), but in the face of rising
inﬂation, this is counter to key monetary principles. In emerging market countries as a
whole, interest rates increased by 137 basis points, but this is far less than the roughly
3 percentage point increase in global inﬂation in these countries.
Why, by this global measure, do central banks seem to be so far behind the curve?
One reason might be that they are reacting to reductions in real GDP, or an opening
of the GDP gap. However, as I discuss later, such GDP declines, even when one uses
forecasts,do not appear tobe enough toexplain thedeviation of interestratesfrom more
appropriate levels based on inﬂation and GDP. Another more promising explanation is
that central banks are taking exchange rates into account when setting interest rates.
See Edwards (2006). Indeed, central banks sometimes admit that the prevailing interest
rate around the world affects their decisions. Letting their interest rate rise above a
prevailing but declining global interest rate would cause their currency to appreciate,
something that the central bank might want to avoid because of the effect on exports
and GDP growth. In the case where a central bank follows a dollar exchange rate peg,
the central bank’s interest rate must, of course, be cut along with a decline in the federal
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funds rate, which causes easier monetary policy in the United States to be exported
abroad automatically. See Carlozzi and Taylor (1985) for model simulations of this
phenomenon. But even central bankers with ﬂexible exchange rate policies watch the
federal funds rate and its futures carefully when making policy decisions.
In a presentation I recently gave at the Banque de France (Taylor [2008b]), I noted
the empirical relationship between Eurozone interest rates and U.S. interest rates. I
examined the deviation of the overnight interest rate target for the European Central
Bank from a simple guideline for that interest rate—the Taylor rule—which depends
on the inﬂation rate and the gap between real GDP and its potential level. An estimated
linear relationship with that deviation on the left-hand side has a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
on the federal funds rate for the period from 2000–06. I have found similar strong
foreign interest rate effects for other central banks.
Hence, when faced with declining interest rates abroad, say because of a cut in the
federal funds rate, there is a danger that central banks will move off course due to con-
cerns about the exchange rate. In doing so, central banks will be reducing interest rates
below levels needed for price stability, which could be a factor in the recent resurgence
of global inﬂation.
How do these results square with the result (for example, Taylor [1985]) that there
is little need for direct interest rate coordination between central banks when exchange
rates are ﬂexible? The reason is that in practice central banks take exchange rates into
account in their interest rate responses. Clearly this would be inﬂationary in the current
environment, and thereby is part of the explanation for the increased global inﬂation
today.
In his recent assessment, Lipsky (2008) reaches the same conclusion: “The easing
in US monetary policy also has tended to generate an easing in monetary conditions in
countries with currencies closely linked to the dollar. In some economies in Asia and
the Middle East, rising commodity prices have exacerbated general inﬂation pressures,
while an easing of conditions has made monetary policy overly-accommodative.”
B. Financial Instability and Risks
Much has already been written about the recent crisis in the global ﬁnancial markets
since last summer (see Cecchetti [2008]), so there is little need here to review the
causes, which trace to low interest rates in the period from 2003 to 2005, the boom
in housing prices, and the excessive lending and underestimation of risks by many ﬁ-
nancial institutions and investors. There is no doubt that the resulting instability and
risks are highly unusual as has been documented by an examination of money market
spreads by Taylor and Williams (2008). Fortunately, the crisis has not spread thus far
to ﬁnancial institutions in countries that had no connection to the questionable ﬁnan-
cial instruments. For example, the sharp rise in spreads in the money markets in North
America and Europe has not been seen in Japan as it was during the “Japan premium”
days in the 1990s.
The crisis has brought forth many policy responses in the United States. A large
discretionary ﬁscal package was enacted, and checks are now being sent out to millions
of Americans. The Federal Reserve cut interest rates sharply, introduced several new
lending facilities, intervened to prevent creditors from pulling out of investment bank
43Bear Stearns and the credit markets more generally, and numerous programs to support
the housing market and prevent foreclosures have been put in place or are about to
get underway. There are also many proposals for increased regulation of the ﬁnancial
markets, especially in light of the Fed’s facilities that provide loans to investment banks.
Thus far, however, the crisis has not had large depressing effects on the overall
U.S. economy. Real GDP slowed in the fourth quarter of 2007 and the ﬁrst quarter
of 2008, but strength in other sectors has prevented employment declines in housing
and ﬁnancial services from leading to comparable declines in the rest of the economy.
Moreover, the increase in housing prices during the housing boom has left prices too
high in many parts of the United States, and it makes sense for these prices to fall to
a new equilibrium. Public policy should not get in the way of allowing the appropriate
price adjustments.
According to standard interest rate guidelines, such as the Taylor rule, the cut in
the federal funds rate has been larger than theory or experience over the past 25 years
would suggest is appropriate, even after making corrections for the increased spreads
in the money market as suggested in Taylor (2008a). The connection with the increase
in inﬂation is, of course, that the lower interest rates will create inﬂationary pressures,
which will be especially problematic if the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis turns out to
remain mild for the rest of the economy. Moreover, the low interest rates in the United
States may have increased inﬂationary pressures outside the United States.
C. Energy and Other Commodity Prices
The impetus for the increases in energy and commodity prices is, of course, found in
relative shifts in demand and supply for speciﬁc goods. At least in the case of energy,
the high prices are beginning to send signals to ﬁrms and consumers that they will
have to make adjustments and public policy should not interfere with price controls or
subsidies. Indeed, there is evidence that part of the high price of certain agricultural
commodities is caused by subsidies which increase the demand for their production,
corn-based ethanol being a prime example.
However, there is strong evidence that at least part of the increase in energy and
commodity prices is related to the global inﬂationary pressures and thereby, in part,
to the policy response to the ﬁnancial crisis in the United States. As was clear in the
1970s, oil price shocks tend to be larger, at least in nominal terms, when monetary-
induced inﬂationary pressures are high. Indeed, that was an important lesson learned
from Governor Mayekawa’s experience in the 1970s as I reviewed in the opening of
this lecture.
More speciﬁc evidence comes from recent research at the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). For example, Lipsky (2008) reports: “Preliminary evidence suggests that
low interest rates have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on commodity prices, above
and beyond the typical effect of increased demand. Exchange rate shifts also appear to
inﬂuence commodity prices. For example, IMF estimates suggest that if the US dollar
had remained at its 2002 peak through end-2007, oil prices would have been $25 a
barrel lower and non-fuel commodity prices 12 percent lower.”
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D. Exchange Rates
I mentioned the inconsistency between certain exchange rate management policies and
the goal of keeping global inﬂation low. A closely related issue is that in the effort to
keep the exchange rate from rising in the face of declining global interest rates, central
banks have had to increase their foreign reserves. Some of these funds are spilling over
into sovereign wealth funds along with government revenues from higher energy prices.
Indeed, some of these funds have invested in distressed ﬁnancial institutions increasing
their capital and achieving some needed de-leveraging without reducing loans.
Hence, the interaction between the global inﬂation, the ﬁnancial crisis, interest
rates, energy prices, and exchange rates is complex and multidirectional. There are
many other connections, including the impact on asset and liability accumulation from
the current account imbalances and protectionist reactions, but I think I have said
enough to make my point.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
Monetary economists stress the need for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models of the whole economy, indeed of the whole global economy, in or-
der to properly evaluate monetary policy options. As the list of issues addressed in this
lecture illustrates, there is a need to consider an even more comprehensive set of general
equilibrium issues when considering policy options in the current environment. These
issues go well beyond monetary policy, but are connected to it. Assessing these broader
interconnected issues on a rigorous and comprehensive basis is an important challenge
for researchers in my view.
The challenge for policymakers is to ﬁnd a way to take account of the interactions
and move forward on a more comprehensive approach. It is clear that the policies must
have an international focus. This was stressed by Mayekawa many years ago and is
even more important today.
Where might policymakers begin? In my view, a good place to start is with dis-
cussions about some kind of global inﬂation target. It does not need to be a numerical
target. It could be a concept along the lines of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan that
the global inﬂation rate should not be so large or volatile that it interferes with private
sector decision making.
Such discussions will naturally lead to questions of how such a goal would impact
on the decisions of individual central banks. We are certainly a long way off from
the science ﬁctional account recently told by Stephen King of HSBC (May 19, 2008).
“Imaginethis.Tomorrowmorning, BenBernankeiswokenbyaphonecallfromGeorge
Bush who informs the Fed chairman that, overnight, a new monetary union has been
created involving the US and all the emerging economies. The Federal Reserve will
no longer look after monetary policy for the US alone, but instead set interest rates for
the good of the new monetary union. The new ‘one size ﬁts all’ approach would surely
force Mr Bernanke to raise interest rates from where they are today because inﬂation in
this imaginary monetary union is currently averaging about 6 per cent (and rising).”
45More realistically, such discussions will focus attention on exchange rate regimes,
monetary policy strategies, energy prices, foreign reserve holdings, and the proper role
of regulation of ﬁnancial and other markets. If we can extrapolate from the sensible
recommendations of Mayekawa in the 1980s, we can hope for a push back from the
increased use of demand management and calls for regulation along as well as a push
forward toward market-based adjustments and price stability.
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